What does “good” mean? (Philosophy HL)

The big idea: The whole topic keeps circling one word: good. So ask the most basic language question of all.

When you say 'stealing is wrong', are you stating a fact — reporting how things are, so your claim can be true or false? Or are you doing something else — expressing a feeling, or waving people away from stealing? Meta-ethics ends by looking at what our moral words actually do.

This splits into two camps: cognitivism and non-cognitivism.

The split turns on one question: can a moral claim be true or false at all?

Cognitivism: moral claims can be true or false: The cognitivist treats 'stealing is wrong' like 'grass is green' — a statement that reports something and so can be true or false. This fits how morality sounds: we argue about it, say people are 'mistaken', try to get it 'right'. You can only be right or wrong about something if there's a fact of the matter — so cognitivism travels naturally with moral realism from the last micro.

Non-cognitivism: moral claims aren't statements: The non-cognitivist says 'stealing is wrong' only looks like a statement. It isn't really reporting a fact — it's expressing something. It's closer to booing at stealing, or telling people not to do it. On this view a moral claim can't be true or false, because it was never a fact-report in the first place. This fits anti-realism: if there are no moral facts, moral talk must be doing something other than describing them.

Checkpoint — the split: In one line: cognitivism says moral claims can be true or false; non-cognitivism says they only look like statements but really express feeling. Now the sharpest version of non-cognitivism.

One vivid theory turns non-cognitivism into a slogan; then a famous puzzle asks what 'good' could even name.

Emotivism: the 'boo!/hurrah!' theory: Emotivism is the boldest non-cognitivist view. Saying 'cruelty is wrong' is really saying 'Boo to cruelty!'; saying 'kindness is good' is 'Hurrah for kindness!'. Moral words vent feeling and try to stir the same feeling in you — they don't state facts. Its strength: it explains why morality moves us to act (feelings do that). Its weakness: it makes moral disagreement look like two people just booing and cheering, when real moral arguments feel like genuine disputes about who's right.

Naturalism vs non-naturalism about 'good': Cognitivists who think 'good' names a real property still split. Naturalism says 'good' boils down to a natural, this-world fact — e.g. 'good' means 'what increases happiness'. Non-naturalism replies with the open question: for ANY natural fact — say 'increases happiness' — you can still sensibly ask 'but is increasing happiness good?'. Since that question stays open, 'good' can't just mean that natural fact; it names something extra you can't reduce away.

Go further — higher-level insight: See how this micro ties the whole topic together. Cognitivism travels with realism (4.2.2) and the 'discovered' side (4.2.1); non-cognitivism and emotivism travel with anti-realism and the 'feeling' source (Hume). The open question argument is the language-level echo of Hume's fact–value gap: you can list every natural fact and 'good' still isn't captured. Linking language, facts and sources across all four micros is exactly the synthesis a §B essay rewards.

Checkpoint — 'good': In one line: emotivism reduces moral words to 'boo!/hurrah!', while the open question suggests 'good' names something real you can't reduce to any natural fact. Four theories of moral language now sit on the table.

How Section B works: Section B gives you a choice of essay questions on the optional themes (Ethics is one) [25]. No stimulus — just a claim to evaluate, using your own knowledge. 'Evaluate the claim that…' is the classic wording, and the whole of 4.2 arms you for it.

Common mistakes: 1. Describing cognitivism and emotivism instead of arguing between them. 2. Ignoring 'nothing more than' — the claim's strength or weakness is in those words. 3. Only one view — top bands need tension. 4. No conclusion — decide, with a reason. 5. Name-dropping — a theory earns nothing without its argument.