By the 1870s the Zulu kingdom, built by Shaka earlier in the century, was the strongest African military state in southern Africa.
Cetshwayo's independence: Its king, Cetshwayo, kept the regimental amabutho system intact. He refused to become a labour reserve for the neighbouring British colony of Natal. That independence — not any act of aggression — was what made the British determined to destroy his kingdom.
In 1878 the British High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, invented a pretext: he issued Cetshwayo an ultimatum demanding the disbanding of the amabutho, knowing it was impossible for a Zulu king to accept and survive. When Cetshwayo did not comply, Frere ordered an invasion in January 1879 without London's authorisation — this was local imperialism on the ground, not a planned decision from Britain.
Why the Zulu could resist so effectively at first: The amabutho gave the Zulu a large, disciplined, full-time fighting force organised for mass infantry attack (the 'horns of the buffalo' encirclement tactic). At Isandlwana (22 January 1879) around 20,000 Zulu warriors overwhelmed a British camp of about 1,800 troops — the worst defeat inflicted on a modern European army by an African force in the 19th century.
- Isandlwana (Jan 1879) — massive Zulu victory; exposed poor British reconnaissance and overconfidence
- Rorke's Drift (Jan 1879) — small British garrison held off a Zulu assault, restoring British morale and propaganda value at home
- Ulundi (July 1879) — British brought overwhelming firepower (artillery, Gatling guns, disciplined square formation); Cetshwayo's capital burned and his kingdom broken
Ultimately Zulu resistance failed for reasons that echo across the whole topic: the amabutho, however brave, fought with spears and a small number of outdated firearms against breech-loading rifles and artillery. There was also no realistic diplomatic path — Frere wanted conquest, not negotiation, so Cetshwayo's willingness to talk (he sent messengers before Ulundi) made no difference.
What happened to the kingdom afterwards: Britain did not simply annex Zululand. It was carved into 13 rival chiefdoms in 1879 to prevent the Zulu ever reuniting — a deliberate divide-and-rule policy. Civil war followed, and the kingdom was formally annexed by Britain only in 1887.
Defeat was not the end: This shows that African military defeat and final colonial control were often separated by years of aftermath, not a single battle.
| Factor | Zulu kingdom | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Political structure | Centralised kingship, единый command under Cetshwayo | Allowed fast mobilisation but made the king himself the target |
| Military strength | Amabutho regiments, mass infantry tactics | Won at Isandlwana but could not match sustained firepower |
| Access to firearms | Some muskets, mostly obsolete | No answer to artillery and Gatling guns at Ulundi |
| Colonial attitude | Frere wanted conquest, ignored London's caution | No genuine chance to negotiate a settlement |
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The Asante Empire in what is now Ghana had a long history of resisting British encroachment from the coast. Three separate wars between 1873 and 1900 show a pattern.
The pattern
- Repeated Asante resistance
- Growing British determination to finish the job, for economic and strategic reasons
- Above all: control of the gold-rich interior, and removal of a rival power blocking British expansion
Third Asante War, 1873–74
Asantehene Kofi Karikari's forces pushed toward the coast to reassert control over tribute-paying states allied with Britain. General Garnet Wolseley led a British invasion, burned the capital Kumasi, and forced a treaty ending the Asante claim over coastal states — but the empire itself survived.
Fourth Asante War, 1896
Britain invaded again, this time to formally impose a protectorate. Asantehene Prempeh I was arrested and exiled (to the Seychelles) without major fighting — the aim now was direct control, not just punishment.
War of the Golden Stool, 1900
The British governor demanded the Golden Stool (the sacred symbol of Asante kingship and unity, never meant to be sat on). This demand was so offensive to Asante identity that it triggered a final uprising led by the Asante queen mother Yaa Asantewaa. It was defeated, and the Asante kingdom was formally annexed as a British colony in 1902.
1873 pushed them back, 1896 took their king, 1900 took their symbol — each war left Britain more entrenched.
Explain *reasons*, not just events: For Paper 3 you must explain why the Asante kept resisting and why Britain kept intervening — not just narrate the battles.
Why the Asante kept resisting
- A strong, centralised state
- Real military capacity
- Deep cultural attachment to independence (the Golden Stool)
Why Britain kept intervening
- Trade interests
- Prestige
- Fear that an unconquered Asante Empire would encourage other African resistance
- Reasons Asante kept resisting — centralised, wealthy state with its own army and gunpowder trade; strong sense of independent identity; earlier partial successes encouraged further resistance
- Reasons Britain intervened repeatedly — protection of coastal trade allies and revenue; desire to end a persistent regional rival; the Golden Stool incident showed prestige and symbolism mattered as much as economics
- Why resistance ultimately failed — Britain could return with larger, better-armed forces each time; the Asante state, though strong regionally, could not out-produce British military technology over three wars
The 1900 war is often the one examiners want detail on because it shows resistance driven by cultural and symbolic factors, not only political survival — a useful contrast to the Zulu case, where the driver was mainly maintaining an independent political and military system.
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Not every African leader chose resistance. Several calculated that collaboration — negotiating a place within the colonial system — better protected their people and their own power than a war they were likely to lose.
Why rulers chose to collaborate
- Pragmatism — recognising that resistance would probably fail and cost many lives.
- A willing colonial partner — Britain was often open to negotiation when it cost less than conquest.
- Gains from cooperation — protection from rival African or European powers, and continued local political and economic authority.
- Lack of alternative — for smaller or weaker states, isolation without a stronger neighbour's protection was a real risk.
- Lewanika (Lozi kingdom, Barotseland) — signed treaties with the British South Africa Company from 1890, seeking protection from Ndebele and Portuguese pressure; retained internal authority over Barotseland in exchange for accepting British overrule and mineral concessions
- Khama III (Bangwato, Bechuanaland) — actively sought a British protectorate (travelled to London in 1895) specifically to keep Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa Company out of his territory; preserved more internal self-government than almost any other collaborating ruler in the region
Khama's collaboration was a form of resistance to something worse: Khama did not want colonial rule for its own sake. He collaborated with the British government directly in order to resist annexation by Rhodes's chartered company, which he saw as more exploitative and less accountable.
A key exam point: Collaboration and resistance were not always opposites — sometimes collaborating with one power was a strategy to resist a worse one.
Buganda: resistance and collaboration in the same kingdom
Buganda shows both responses within a single kingdom and a single generation. Kabaka Mwanga, the young king, resisted growing British and missionary influence in the 1880s-90s — including violent conflict with Christian converts at court and armed rebellion against British administrators in 1897. His resistance failed: he was defeated, deposed, and exiled by 1899.
By contrast, the chief minister Apolo Kagwa chose sustained collaboration with the British. As regent for the young King Daudi Chwa after Mwanga's exile, Kagwa negotiated the 1900 Buganda Agreement, which gave Buganda's ruling elite freehold land (mailo) and a privileged, semi-autonomous place inside the British protectorate of Uganda — arguably the most favourable settlement any African kingdom achieved under British rule.
Mwanga — resistance
- Saw missionaries and British agents as a direct threat to his authority
- Used force (1897 rebellion) against colonial administrators
- Defeated militarily; deposed and exiled by 1899
- Outcome: loss of personal power, no negotiated protections
Kagwa — collaboration
- Worked with British officials rather than against them
- Negotiated the 1900 Buganda Agreement from a position of usefulness to Britain
- Remained in power as regent and chief minister for decades
- Outcome: Buganda kept land rights, local administration and elite status
Same kingdom, opposite strategies, opposite results: Buganda is the best case study for showing an examiner that resistance and collaboration were choices with consequences, not fixed traits of a whole people. Mwanga's resistance cost him his throne; Kagwa's collaboration preserved Buganda's privileged status within Uganda for decades.