Zulu defeat, the Asante Wars, and the choice to collaborate: Lewanika, Khama and Buganda (History HL)

By the 1870s the Zulu kingdom, built by Shaka earlier in the century, was the strongest African military state in southern Africa. Its king, Cetshwayo, kept the regimental amabutho system intact and refused to become a labour reserve for the neighbouring British colony of Natal. That independence — not any act of aggression — was what made the British determined to destroy his kingdom.

In 1878 the British High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, invented a pretext: he issued Cetshwayo an ultimatum demanding the disbanding of the amabutho, knowing it was impossible for a Zulu king to accept and survive. When Cetshwayo did not comply, Frere ordered an invasion in January 1879 without London's authorisation — this was local imperialism on the ground, not a planned decision from Britain.

Why the Zulu could resist so effectively at first: The amabutho gave the Zulu a large, disciplined, full-time fighting force organised for mass infantry attack (the 'horns of the buffalo' encirclement tactic). At Isandlwana (22 January 1879) around 20,000 Zulu warriors overwhelmed a British camp of about 1,800 troops — the worst defeat inflicted on a modern European army by an African force in the 19th century.

Ultimately Zulu resistance failed for reasons that echo across the whole topic: the amabutho, however brave, fought with spears and a small number of outdated firearms against breech-loading rifles and artillery. There was also no realistic diplomatic path — Frere wanted conquest, not negotiation, so Cetshwayo's willingness to talk (he sent messengers before Ulundi) made no difference.

What happened to the kingdom afterwards: Britain did not simply annex Zululand. It was carved into 13 rival chiefdoms in 1879 to prevent the Zulu ever reuniting — a deliberate divide-and-rule policy. Civil war followed, and the kingdom was formally annexed by Britain only in 1887. This shows that African military defeat and final colonial control were often separated by years of aftermath, not a single battle.

The Asante Empire in what is now Ghana had a long history of resisting British encroachment from the coast. Three separate wars between 1873 and 1900 show a pattern: repeated Asante resistance, followed by growing British determination to finish the job for economic and strategic reasons — above all, control of the gold-rich interior and removal of a rival power blocking British expansion.

Explain *reasons*, not just events: For Paper 3 you must explain why the Asante kept resisting and why Britain kept intervening — not just narrate the battles. Asante resistance came from a strong, centralised state with real military capacity and deep cultural attachment to independence (the Golden Stool). British intervention was driven by trade interests, prestige, and fear that an unconquered Asante Empire would encourage other African resistance.

The 1900 war is often the one examiners want detail on because it shows resistance driven by cultural and symbolic factors, not only political survival — a useful contrast to the Zulu case, where the driver was mainly maintaining an independent political and military system.

Not every African leader chose resistance. Several calculated that collaboration — negotiating a place within the colonial system — better protected their people and their own power than a war they were likely to lose.

Why rulers chose to collaborate: Pragmatism — recognising that resistance would probably fail and cost many lives.

A willing colonial partner — Britain was often open to negotiation when it cost less than conquest.

Gains from cooperation — protection from rival African or European powers, and continued local political and economic authority.

Lack of alternative — for smaller or weaker states, isolation without a stronger neighbour's protection was a real risk.

Khama's collaboration was a form of resistance to something worse: Khama did not want colonial rule for its own sake — he collaborated with the British government directly in order to resist annexation by Rhodes's chartered company, which he saw as more exploitative and less accountable. This is a key exam point: collaboration and resistance were not always opposites — sometimes collaborating with one power was a strategy to resist a worse one.

Buganda: resistance and collaboration in the same kingdom

Buganda shows both responses within a single kingdom and a single generation. Kabaka Mwanga, the young king, resisted growing British and missionary influence in the 1880s-90s — including violent conflict with Christian converts at court and armed rebellion against British administrators in 1897. His resistance failed: he was defeated, deposed, and exiled by 1899.

By contrast, the chief minister Apolo Kagwa chose sustained collaboration with the British. As regent for the young King Daudi Chwa after Mwanga's exile, Kagwa negotiated the 1900 Buganda Agreement, which gave Buganda's ruling elite freehold land (mailo) and a privileged, semi-autonomous place inside the British protectorate of Uganda — arguably the most favourable settlement any African kingdom achieved under British rule.

Same kingdom, opposite strategies, opposite results: Buganda is the best case study for showing an examiner that resistance and collaboration were choices with consequences, not fixed traits of a whole people. Mwanga's resistance cost him his throne; Kagwa's collaboration preserved Buganda's privileged status within Uganda for decades.