Between 1870 and 1920, European powers seized huge areas of Africa in what is called the Scramble for Africa. African peoples and states did not all react the same way. Some picked up weapons and fought. Others chose to negotiate and work with the newcomers. This micro looks at resistance — armed or organised opposition to colonial rule. Part 2 will look at collaboration — working with the colonisers instead.
What decided whether a people resisted?: Historians point to four main factors: how determined a state was to stay independent, how brutal or inflexible the colonising power was, the strength of political structures at home, and military strength, especially access to modern firearms.
- Determination to preserve independence — states with a strong sense of identity and pride in their own history (like Ethiopia) were more willing to fight rather than submit.
- Brutality and inflexibility of the coloniser — if the European power refused to negotiate or treated Africans with extreme cruelty, resistance became the only option left.
- Political structures — a centralised state with one clear ruler could organise a war effort far more easily than a loose collection of small chiefdoms.
- Military strength and access to firearms — resistance only had a chance of succeeding if a state could arm and train soldiers to a similar standard as the European army it faced.
Use these four factors as your essay skeleton: Paper 3 questions on this section almost always ask you to explain why some resisted successfully and others failed. These four factors are your ready-made framework — for every case study below, ask which of the four were present and which were missing.
Keep in mind that resistance and success are not the same thing. Some peoples resisted bravely but still lost within months. Others held out for years before being defeated. A small few, like Ethiopia, actually won. As you read the five case studies, note down: who resisted, why, and what the outcome was — that is exactly what Paper 3 will ask you to compare.
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Ethiopian resistance under Menelik II
Menelik II became emperor of Ethiopia in 1889. Italy tried to turn Ethiopia into a protectorate using the Treaty of Wuchale (1889) — the Italian version of the treaty claimed Ethiopia had agreed to hand foreign policy to Italy, but the Amharic version said no such thing. Menelik rejected Italy's claim, and war followed.
The Battle of Adwa, 1 March 1896: Menelik's army of around 100,000 soldiers defeated an Italian force of about 20,000 at Adwa. It was the most complete defeat of a European colonial army by an African state in this period, and it forced Italy to recognise Ethiopian independence in the Treaty of Addis Ababa (1896).
- Strong central authority — Menelik ruled a unified empire, so he could raise, arm and command a huge army quickly.
- Access to modern firearms — Menelik had spent years buying rifles and artillery from European rivals of Italy, including France and Russia, building a well-armed force.
- Terrain and numbers — the Ethiopian highlands were hard for Italy to supply an army into, and Menelik's forces heavily outnumbered the Italians at Adwa.
- Italian overconfidence — Italian commanders underestimated Ethiopian strength and split their forces into three columns that could not support each other.
Mandinka resistance to French rule
In West Africa, Samori Touré built the Mandinka (Wassoulou) Empire and resisted French expansion for close to two decades, from the 1880s until 1898. He reorganised his army along modern lines, with soldiers trained to use and even locally manufacture rifles.
- Reasons for early success — Samori's army was disciplined and well-armed, and he used a scorched-earth strategy, retreating and destroying resources so the French gained little from captured land.
- Reasons for eventual failure — France committed far greater long-term resources and kept pushing reinforcements; Samori could not manufacture rifles fast enough to match French firepower over time.
- Isolation — unlike Menelik, Samori had no European ally supplying him with artillery, and other African states nearby did not unite with him against France.
- Capture — Samori was captured by the French in 1898 and exiled, ending organised Mandinka resistance.
Ethiopia (success)
- Unified empire under one ruler
- Rifles and artillery bought from Italy's European rivals
- Decisive single battle (Adwa) won outright
- Recognised as independent afterwards
Mandinka (eventual failure)
- Empire built more recently, fewer allies
- Weapons partly home-made, harder to keep pace
- Long guerrilla-style war of attrition
- Samori captured, empire absorbed by France
Compare, don't just describe: A weak answer describes Adwa and Samori's campaign separately. A strong answer explicitly compares why one state succeeded permanently and the other only delayed defeat — always link back to firearms, unity and outside support.
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Herero and Nama resistance in Namibia
In German South-West Africa (modern Namibia), the Herero rose up in 1904 after years of losing land and cattle to German settlers, followed soon after by the Nama. German commander General Lothar von Trotha responded with an extermination order, driving the Herero into the Omaheke Desert, where thousands died of thirst and starvation.
Reasons for failure: The Herero and Nama were heavily outgunned, faced a coloniser willing to use genocidal violence rather than negotiate, and had no significant outside support. German forces also used concentration camps against survivors. This is widely recognised today as one of the first genocides of the 20th century.
Cetshwayo and the Zulu kingdom
Cetshwayo kaMpande became Zulu king in 1873 and kept a strong, centralised military system built by earlier Zulu kings. Britain, wanting to remove the Zulu kingdom as an obstacle to confederation in southern Africa, issued an ultimatum in December 1878 that Cetshwayo could not accept, and the Anglo-Zulu War (1879) began.
- Early Zulu success — at Isandlwana (January 1879), Zulu forces using traditional regiments (impis) defeated a modern British column, one of the most striking African victories against a European army.
- Ultimate defeat — Britain sent reinforcements and won decisively at Ulundi in July 1879, using superior firepower including artillery and machine guns.
- Why the kingdom fell despite Isandlwana — the Zulu had a strong army but lacked modern rifles in enough numbers, and Britain simply committed more troops and firepower until it won.
- Aftermath — the kingdom was broken up into rival chiefdoms, weakening Zulu unity and making later British annexation easier.
The Asante Wars (1873, 1896, 1900)
The Asante Empire (in modern Ghana) fought Britain in three separate wars. In 1873–74 Asante was defeated but stayed independent. In 1896 Britain exiled the Asantehene (king) and declared a protectorate without full conquest. In 1900, the War of the Golden Stool broke out after a British governor demanded the sacred Golden Stool — the symbol of Asante kingship — provoking rebellion led by Yaa Asantewaa, the Queen Mother of Ejisu.
| War | Trigger | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| 1873–74 | British expedition against Asante | Asante defeated but remained independent |
| 1896 | British demand for a protectorate | Asantehene exiled; protectorate declared |
| 1900 | British demand for the Golden Stool | Rebellion crushed; Asante formally annexed 1901 |
Why Asante kept resisting across three wars: Asante had a long tradition of centralised military organisation and fierce pride in its royal symbols, shown by the fact that the final war was fought over the Golden Stool itself, not land or trade. But repeated wars gradually wore down Asante's independence until full annexation followed in 1901.
Firearms mattered, but were not everything: Isandlwana and Adwa prove African armies could win single battles even against modern European forces. What usually decided the war, not just the battle, was which side could keep supplying weapons, soldiers and money for years, not months.