In 1871, Germany suddenly became the strongest state on the European continent. Otto von Bismarck had just united it after crushing France in war — and that single fact rearranged the whole diplomatic map.
This micro is about balance of power: how it shifted after 1871, and how Germany's own foreign policy pushed it further out of balance by 1914. Both are classic Paper 3 exam themes — you need the facts AND the arguments about who was really to blame.
Bismarck's aim: keep France isolated: After 1871 Bismarck's one goal was to stop France getting revenge for its defeat and its lost territory (Alsace-Lorraine). His method: build alliances that boxed France in, and avoid provoking Britain or Russia. This is why the 1871–1890 alliance system looks so defensive.
Imperial expansion mattered too. As Britain, France, Germany, Russia and others competed for colonies in Africa and Asia in the 1880s–90s (the Scramble for Africa), their rivalries abroad spilled back into European diplomacy.
- Colonial friction bred distrust — Britain and France clashed over Egypt and West Africa; Britain and Russia competed in Central Asia and Persia. These quarrels made alliances feel necessary for protection.
- Colonies became status symbols — a 'Great Power' was expected to hold an empire. This pushed even latecomers like Germany and Italy to chase colonies after 1884, adding new rivals to the mix.
- But colonial rivalry rarely caused war directly before 1914 — most colonial disputes (like the 1898 Fashoda Crisis between Britain and France) were settled by negotiation, not fighting. Historians debate how much empire really drove the alliance system versus purely European concerns.
The clearest test of the new balance of power came in the Balkans, where the declining Ottoman Empire was losing control of its European territory.
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The Ottoman Empire had been shrinking for decades. Nationalist revolts in the Balkans and repeated wars with Russia chipped away at its European lands — a slow collapse contemporaries called the Eastern Question.
In 1877–78 Russia went to war with the Ottomans, won, and imposed the Treaty of San Stefano, creating a huge new pro-Russian Bulgaria. Britain and Austria-Hungary were alarmed — a Bulgaria that size gave Russia a route to the Mediterranean.
Congress of Berlin, 1878: Bismarck hosted the other powers in Berlin to defuse the crisis. The treaty shrank Bulgaria, gave Austria-Hungary the right to administer Bosnia-Herzegovina, and confirmed independence for Serbia, Montenegro and Romania. Bismarck called himself an 'honest broker' — but the settlement left deep resentments that resurfaced later.
| Power | What it gained or wanted | Why it mattered later |
|---|---|---|
| Austria-Hungary | Right to occupy/administer Bosnia-Herzegovina | Formally annexed in 1908 — enraged Serbia, a spark for 1914 |
| Russia | Forced to accept a smaller Bulgaria than it wanted | Felt humiliated; pushed Russia to see itself as protector of Slavs |
| Serbia | Full independence recognized | Became the focus of South Slav nationalism, threatening Austria-Hungary |
| Britain | Blocked a large pro-Russian Bulgaria | Preserved its Mediterranean route to India for now |
So the Congress of Berlin looks like a diplomatic success in the short term — it avoided a general European war in 1878. But it papered over the real problem: the Ottoman Empire kept declining, and the Balkan nationalities it used to rule kept fighting over the scraps.
Two sides of the Congress of Berlin: Argument FOR success: it kept the peace in 1878 and showed Bismarck skilfully managing a crisis without war. Argument AGAINST: it was only a short-term fix — unresolved Balkan nationalism and Austro-Russian rivalry over the region resurfaced in the Bosnian Crisis (1908) and the Balkan Wars (1912–13), feeding directly into July 1914. A strong essay uses BOTH views to reach a judgement.
As Ottoman power kept fading into the 1900s, Austria-Hungary and Russia increasingly saw the Balkans as their own backyard — and their rivalry there, not the Ottomans, became the real long-term danger to peace.
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Bismarck's alliance system (1871–1890) was built to isolate France and keep Germany safe, not to prepare for war.
Three Emperors' League (1873, renewed 1881)
Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia agreed to consult each other — kept Russia and Austria-Hungary from fighting over the Balkans, and kept France isolated.
Dual Alliance (1879)
Germany and Austria-Hungary promised mutual defence against Russia. This became the core of Bismarck's system and later the Central Powers.
Triple Alliance (1882)
Italy joined Germany and Austria-Hungary, mainly to gain support against France over colonial rivalry in North Africa.
Reinsurance Treaty (1887)
A secret deal keeping Russia and Germany neutral toward each other even though Russia and Austria-Hungary were rivals — Bismarck's most delicate balancing act.
Bismarck's rule: many alliances, no enemies picked, France always isolated.
Everything changed after 1888. Wilhelm II became Kaiser and wanted to rule personally, not just as a figurehead. In 1890 he dismissed Bismarck and let the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia lapse.
The fatal mistake: losing Russia: Without the Reinsurance Treaty, Russia had no reason to stay friendly with Germany. In 1894 Russia and France — Germany's two potential enemies — signed their own alliance. Bismarck's whole strategy of keeping France isolated collapsed within four years of his departure.
Domestic conditions pushed Wilhelm II toward an aggressive foreign policy too. Germany's economy and population were booming, its middle class wanted the prestige of empire, and conservative elites (landowners, the military) used nationalism to distract from calls for democratic reform at home.
From the late 1890s Germany pursued Weltpolitik. Unlike Bismarck's cautious European focus, Weltpolitik meant competing for colonies and status worldwide — and building a battle fleet to do it.
Weltpolitik as ambition
- Germany was Europe's strongest economy — many argued it deserved a 'place in the sun' matching its power
- Wilhelm II wanted personal glory and to be treated as an equal of Britain's Queen Victoria and Russia's Tsar
- The Navy Laws (from 1898, Admiral Tirpitz) aimed to build a fleet that could challenge British naval supremacy
Weltpolitik as blunder
- It had no clear strategic goal — Germany gained few valuable colonies for the money and risk spent
- Wilhelm II's erratic personal diplomacy (e.g. the 1908 Daily Telegraph interview) repeatedly alarmed other powers
- The naval race directly pushed Britain — previously not hostile to Germany — into fear and alliance-building
- Britain abandoned 'splendid isolation' and signed the Entente Cordiale with France (1904) and an entente with Russia (1907) — mainly to contain the German naval threat, not because Britain loved its old rivals.
- France used the new Franco-Russian alliance (1894) and Entente Cordiale (1904) to end its isolation and rebuild confidence after 1871.
- Russia, embarrassed at Berlin in 1878 and defeated by Japan in 1905, leaned harder on its French alliance and increasingly saw itself as protector of the Slavs in the Balkans.
- Austria-Hungary, worried by its own ethnic divisions and Balkan nationalism, became more dependent on its German ally — the one power still firmly on its side.
By 1907 Europe was split into two camps — the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) facing the Triple Entente (Britain, France, Russia). Weltpolitik hadn't given Germany the global respect Wilhelm II wanted; instead it had turned potential friends into a ring of suspicious rivals.