Key Idea: Topic 6.1 asks what science actually is — how it works, why we trust it, and where the line runs between science and everything else. It turns out that line is much harder to draw than it looks. This is the optional theme Philosophy of science, examined in Paper 1 Section B: a 25-mark essay, usually 'Evaluate the claim that…', with no stimulus — just a question you argue.
🔬 The four big questions, one card each
Topic 6.1 at a glance
- 6.1.1 · What makes something science? — The demarcation problem: what separates science from pseudo-science? The obvious answers (uses experiments, is useful, is done by scientists) all fail. And a deeper worry — does science reach the truth, or just what works?
- 6.1.2 · Falsification — Popper's rule: a claim is scientific only if it could be proven FALSE. Science means bold guesses honestly tested, not endless confirmations. Powerful — but real theories aren't dropped the moment one test fails.
- 6.1.3 · Paradigms and revolutions — Kuhn: science mostly runs inside a shared paradigm; anomalies pile up until the frame cracks and a revolution swaps it. Feyerabend goes further — there is no one method that all good science follows.
- 6.1.4 · Induction and the scientific method — Science reasons from observed cases to general laws (induction). Hume's problem: no run of past cases can prove the future will match. We rely on induction we can't fully justify — the crack under the whole method.
Confirming a theory is not the same as proving it. You can pile up cases that fit ('every swan I've seen is white') and still be one observation away from being wrong. That gap — between evidence that supports and evidence that proves — is why Hume's problem, Popper's falsification and Kuhn's revolutions all matter. Science is our best-tested guessing, not certainty.
✍️ Bring it together — a Paper 1 Section B essay
Evaluate the claim that science gives us knowledge because it is proven by evidence.
🔒 Model answer plan
See the mark-by-mark plan — for / against / judgement, with marking guidance — in study mode.
Important: Describing the thinkers instead of arguing with them. Don't just say 'Popper thinks X, Kuhn thinks Y.' Give each view a reason, test it with an objection, then decide. A name earns nothing without its argument — and a top answer always reaches a reasoned conclusion, never 'it's just opinion'. Remember: Section B has no stimulus, so don't invent one — argue the claim directly.
✅ Check yourself
If you can answer these six, you have the spine of the whole topic.
What is the demarcation problem? The problem of drawing the line between science and non-science (or pseudo-science). The obvious tests — uses experiments, is useful, done by scientists — all let in things we'd reject.
Popper's falsification rule? A claim is scientific only if it could in principle be proven false. Science means bold, testable guesses that we genuinely try to disprove — not endless confirmations.
Why can't confirmation prove a theory? No amount of supporting cases rules out a future exception. 'Every swan so far is white' is never proof; one black swan overturns it.
What is a Kuhnian paradigm shift? Normal science runs inside a shared framework; anomalies build up until the framework breaks and a scientific revolution replaces it with a new paradigm.
Feyerabend's claim? There is no single method all good science follows — 'anything goes'. Rigid method-worship would have blocked real discoveries.
Hume's problem of induction? Science reasons from observed cases to general laws, but no run of past cases can prove the future will match them — so induction can't be fully justified.
Exam Tips
- Section B is a 25-mark ESSAY on the optional theme with NO stimulus — argue the claim directly, don't invent a scenario.
- Turn the claim into a question, then argue for → argue against → weigh → conclude.
- Name a thinker ONLY with their argument — Popper's falsification, Hume's induction, Kuhn's paradigms — a name alone earns nothing.
- Always weigh at least two views and end on a reasoned conclusion, not a list of positions.