The big idea: So far it looks like a straight fight: either your choices are free, or they're caused. Compatibilism says that's a false choice — free will and determinism can both be true at once. The trick is what we mean by 'free'.
The compatibilist agrees every choice is caused. But they say 'free' never meant 'uncaused' in the first place — it meant something we can still have in a determined world.
Hold onto this: The whole debate turns on redefining 'free'. If 'free' means 'uncaused', determinism kills it. If 'free' means 'acting on your own desires, unforced', determinism leaves it standing.
Free preview
This is the free notes preview
You're reading the free notes. Aimnova Pro unlocks the full study experience — and you can try it free for 7 days:
- FlashcardsLock in vocabulary and key terms with spaced repetition.
- Practice questionsAnswer exam-style questions and get instant AI marking.
- Mock exams & past-paper vaultSit full mocks and see exactly how examiners award marks.
- Personalised study planA daily plan built around your exam date and weak areas.
Start your 7-day free trial Full access to Aimnova Pro · cancel anytime
Start with the philosopher who defends having both.
Dennett's compatibilism: Daniel Dennett argues you are free when you act on your OWN desires without being forced — even if those desires were themselves caused. Compare two people leaving a shop with unpaid goods: one chose to steal, the other was dragged out at gunpoint. Both were 'caused', but only the first acted on their own will. That difference — unforced vs forced — is what freedom really means, and determinism doesn't erase it.
Checkpoint — Dennett: Dennett's move: freedom = unforced action on your own desires, not uncaused action. So a determined world can still hold the only freedom worth wanting.
Memorize terms 3x faster
Smart flashcards show you cards right before you forget them. Perfect for definitions and key concepts.
Try Flashcards Free7-day free trial • No card required
Now the philosopher who says compatibilism dodges the real problem.
Van Inwagen's incompatibilism: Peter van Inwagen is an incompatibilist. His point: if determinism is true, the past plus the laws of nature fix everything — and you control neither. So you could never have done otherwise, and that's what free will really requires. Redefining 'free' as 'unforced', he says, quietly changes the subject: it's still true that only one thing was ever going to happen.
Go further — higher-level insight: Notice the two sides argue about different senses of 'could have done otherwise'. Dennett means 'you'd have acted differently if you'd wanted to'; van Inwagen means 'with the exact same past, another option was really open'. Spotting that they use one phrase two ways is a top-band move.