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Descartes' 'I think, therefore I am'?
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All Flashcards in Topic 1.2
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1.2.111 cards
Descartes' 'I think, therefore I am'?
You can't doubt that thinking is happening, and thinking needs a thinker — so your own existence is certain.
Anattā (no-self)?
The Buddhist teaching that there is no fixed, separate self — only a changing bundle of experiences (Vasubandhu).
Hume on the self?
Looking inside, he only ever found particular perceptions — never a 'self' underneath. Echoes anattā.
The hidden step in Descartes' argument?
'Thinking is happening' is certain; 'therefore a separate ME exists' adds an owner the no-self view rejects.
De Beauvoir on the isolated self?
She rejects the lonely, solipsistic self: a self is real but only becomes itself through others.
Solipsistic?
Treating your own mind as the only thing you can be sure exists.
The three answers to 'is there a self?'
Descartes (yes, a certain thinker); no-self (only a bundle); De Beauvoir (real, but never separate from others).
Why pair Hume with Vasubandhu?
A European and an Indian Buddhist thinker reach the same no-self conclusion — showing the idea across traditions.
The Cartesian 'lone self'?
'I think, therefore I am' — I know myself first, alone, without others.
Best objection to the lone self?
Thinking uses language, which is learned from others — so the self may never be truly alone.
How do you reach the top band in Section A?
Explore an issue, weigh views in tension, and reach a reasoned conclusion — don't just describe.
1.2.28 cards
Self vs non-self?
The boundary between 'me' and 'not-me' — and the sharpest 'not-me' is another person, so others help draw the self.
Sartre's 'the Look'?
The moment another person's gaze makes you aware of yourself as a self — like being caught peeping at a keyhole.
The keyhole example?
Lost in watching, there's no 'you' in mind; the instant someone looks, you feel yourself become a person who can be judged.
Hegel on recognition?
You fully become a self only when another self recognises you — treats you as a someone, not a something.
Self-consciousness?
Being aware of yourself as a self, not just aware of the world around you.
Sartre vs Hegel on the other?
Both say the self needs the Other; Hegel's recognition can be mutual and lifting, Sartre's Look can pin you down as an object.
Why does 'not-me' matter for the self?
To have a sense of 'me' you need a 'not-me' to set it against — the boundary helps make the self.
The shared claim of this micro?
No other, no self — you come to know and become yourself in the eyes of other people.
1.2.38 cards
Solipsism?
The view that only your own mind is certain to exist; every other mind is a guess you can't confirm.
Why can't solipsism be disproved?
You only ever meet the outside of others — a face, words, behaviour — never their inner feeling, so you can't check.
Why can't solipsism be lived?
The moment you love, grieve or apologise, you treat other minds as completely real — so no one truly believes it.
The robot worry?
A perfect robot could wince and cry with nothing inside, so behaviour alone never proves a mind is there.
De Beauvoir's reply to solipsism?
She rejects the sealed-off lonely self it assumes: we don't start alone and prove others; we start among them.
The clever move against solipsism?
Don't try to prove other minds — show the question is badly framed: you were with others all along.
Solipsism in one line?
Unbeatable in theory, impossible in practice, and built on a lonely self that never existed.
What solipsism does NOT claim?
Not that others definitely don't exist — only that your own mind is the one thing you can be certain of.
1.2.48 cards
Intersubjectivity?
The fact that we share one world of meaning with other minds, rather than each living in a private bubble.
Phenomenology?
Carefully describing experience from the inside, exactly as it's lived (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty).
What phenomenology finds about others?
Describe experience honestly and you're always already among others — the world comes pre-shared.
Merleau-Ponty on the body?
We read each other through the body — you feel a friend's sadness in their slumped shoulders before any words.
Buber's I–Thou?
Meeting another person fully as a 'you' — truly present, one person to another.
Buber's I–It?
Treating another person as a thing — an object you use or size up.
Why do Thou-meetings matter for Buber?
You only become a full self in genuine I–Thou meetings, not by using people as Its.
How does intersubjectivity answer solipsism?
Not by proving other minds, but by showing you never started alone — you were always in a shared world.
1.2.58 cards
The main claim about relations with others?
You are partly made of your relationships — not a sealed individual who just happens to meet others.
The four relations to others?
Biological, social, psychological, spiritual — others shape your body, society, mind and sense of meaning.
Biological relation to others?
You literally came from others — born, fed, kept alive by them; no one is self-made from scratch.
Social relation to others?
Your language, manners and roles are handed to you by a group — you think in words others taught you.
Psychological relation to others?
How you feel about yourself grows from how others treated you — praise, blame, love, neglect.
Spiritual relation to others?
Meaning, belonging and purpose usually come through others — a faith, a cause, people you'd live for.
The freedom objection and reply?
You can rebel and remake yourself — but using language and ideas others gave you, so relations run all the way down.
Freedom vs relationships?
Your freedom isn't cancelled by others; it's exercised THROUGH the language, ideas and groups they gave you.
1.2.68 cards
The relational self?
The view that a self is constituted by its relationships — made by them, not just shaped by them.
Confucius on the self?
You become a self by living your roles and relationships well (child, friend, neighbour), not by escaping them.
Ubuntu?
The African view 'I am because we are' — a person becomes a full person through other persons, inside a community.
Ganeri's three constituents of a self?
Immersion (dropped into a shared world), participation (joining its practices), coordination (matching others).
How does Ganeri answer 'but isn't there a single me?'
That 'me' is itself built up out of the immersing and coordinating — take those away and it isn't there.
How does the relational self link to no-self (1.2.1)?
Both drop the sealed core: the self is a stream of relating and participation, not a fixed thing underneath.
The topic's arc in one line?
Is there a self? → the self needs the other → the self is MADE through others (the relational self).
What lifts a Section A answer to the top band?
Exploring and weighing several views on the stimulus and reaching a reasoned conclusion — not describing.
Topic 1.2 study notes
Full notes & explanations for The self and the other
Philosophy exam skills
Paper structures, command terms & tips
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