Theoretical perspectives

The theory that global politics is a struggle for power and survival between self-interested states in an anarchic, self-help world.

That states are the main actors and act in their own national interest, seeking power to survive.

There is no world government above states — no ruler to enforce rules or protect anyone. It does not mean chaos.

One where each state must ultimately rely on itself for its own security, because no one else guarantees it.

When one state arms for defence, others feel less safe and arm too, so everyone ends up more armed and less secure.

The Cold War nuclear arms race shows the security dilemma: two superpowers built huge arsenals for defence, making each other less secure.

Military and economic power — the hard power that lets a state defend itself and get its way.

It explains war, arms races and power politics well, and is realistic about states' self-interest.

It is too pessimistic — it underrates cooperation, IGOs, law, ideas and non-state actors, and can be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Liberalism — where realists see a dangerous self-help world, liberals see room for cooperation.

If states expect the worst and arm accordingly, they can create the very conflict and distrust they feared.

The theory that cooperation between states is possible and that trade, democracy, law and institutions can build a more peaceful, rule-based world.

Trade (interdependence brings peace), institutions (IGOs build trust), democracy (the democratic peace) and international law.

Both accept there is no world government, but liberals argue states can still cooperate through interest, rules and institutions — not just compete for power.

The idea that democracies rarely go to war with one another.

Economically linked states have too much to lose from war, so interdependence makes conflict less likely.

Old enemies like France and Germany bound their economies and institutions together so tightly that war between them became almost unthinkable.

Trade and shared institutions — cooperation and rules, not a balance of military power.

Yes — IGOs, NGOs, companies and individuals all shape global politics, not just states.

It explains real cooperation (EU, UN, trade) and fits an interdependent, connected world.

It can be too optimistic — great powers still use force, and institutions can be ignored by the strong.

Realism — where liberals see room for cooperation, realists see a dangerous self-help world.

The theory that ideas, identities and shared beliefs shape global politics, so states' interests and their friends and enemies are built, not fixed.

That they are socially constructed by ideas and identity, so they are not fixed and can change over time.

Shared expectations about how actors should behave — rules of 'right' conduct that guide states even without enforcement.

The same anarchic world can be friendly or hostile depending on the ideas and identities states hold.

A rivalry realists called permanent ended peacefully when ideas and identities changed — the weapons stayed, but the enmity dissolved.

Because identity and relationship (friend vs enemy) — not the numbers — decide whether power feels threatening.

Realism takes interests and enemies as fixed by material power; constructivism asks where they come from and says they are built by ideas.

It explains change (like the end of the Cold War) that realism and liberalism struggle to account for.

It can be vague and hard to test or predict, and it underrates raw material power and economics.

No — it says power's meaning depends on ideas: the same weapons feel threatening or safe depending on identity.

As a third voice explaining where interests and identities come from, and why global politics changes.

The theory that gender shapes global politics and that mainstream views, by ignoring women's experiences, tell only half the story.

No — it studies gender (the social ideas of masculinity and femininity) and how they shape power, war and security.

It argues real security includes everyday safety — from violence and poverty — not just the state's military security.

Women's experiences and voices, and the unpaid, invisible work (often done by women) that holds economies up.

It recognised that women experience war differently and are excluded from peace talks, and called for their inclusion — the gender lens revealing a gap others missed.

It recognised women's distinct experience of conflict and called for their inclusion in peacebuilding.

Because peace made without half the population is less likely to last, and women see needs and risks that are otherwise missed.

It questions realism's 'gender-neutral' state and narrow, military idea of security, asking who is left out.

It reveals gender gaps other theories ignore, broadens 'security', and has changed real policy (e.g. UNSCR 1325).

Critics say it focuses on one factor (gender), is harder to apply to great-power war, and feminists differ on approach.

Equality — and human security and rights, where excluded groups and everyday safety come to the fore.

The theory that the history of empire still shapes today's global inequalities and whose ideas count — the colonial past did not end with independence.

The Global North = richer, mostly former colonising countries; the Global South = poorer, mostly formerly colonised countries. The divide has colonial roots.

New states inherited borders, economies and institutions designed to serve the empire, not them — so the colonial legacy persisted.

Europeans drew them to suit themselves, splitting or forcing together ethnic groups, and independent states inherited them — fuelling conflict ever since.

European powers in the late 1800s, to suit their own interests — ignoring the people who actually lived there.

It traces the North–South wealth divide to centuries of colonial extraction and domination, not just present-day choices.

That mainstream theories reflect a Western viewpoint and marginalise the perspectives of formerly colonised peoples.

It explains the historical roots of global inequality and highlights whose voices are marginalised.

It can over-focus on the past and downplay present-day internal factors and post-independence choices.

Equality — and development and power, where the North–South divide and domination come to the fore.

That economic and cultural control by powerful states can continue even after formal empire and direct rule have ended.

Because each highlights something real about global politics and misses what the others catch, so no single one is simply 'the truth'.

States seek power and survival in a self-help world — best for explaining conflict.

Cooperation is possible through trade, democracy and institutions — best for explaining cooperation.

Ideas and identities shape what states want — best for explaining change.

Gender shapes power, and women's experiences are left out — best for who is excluded and the human cost.

The legacy of empire still shapes today's inequalities — best for the North–South divide and colonial roots.

Realism and liberalism — they debate how states pursue their interests.

Constructivism, feminist and post-colonial theory — they ask where interests come from and who is left out.

Apply several lenses to the same event, show what each reveals and misses, and reach a judgement.

Using theories against each other on one event and reaching a clear judgement — not describing them one by one.

Match the lens to the case: realism/post-colonial/feminist for conflict, liberalism/constructivism for cooperation and change.