Systems and interactions

The way a country organises power and makes decisions.

A system where the people freely choose those in power, power is checked, and the people can remove them.

A system where power is held by a few, with no real checks and elections absent or fake.

A system that holds elections but is not truly free or fair — part democratic, part authoritarian.

Whether the rulers are freely chosen and checked — and whether the people can remove them.

One where power is held mainly by the central government.

One where power is shared between the central government and regional governments.

The slow weakening of democracy from within — courts packed, media muzzled, elections tilted — while votes still happen.

It shifts a state from the democratic camp toward the authoritarian one, changing how it behaves and who it allies with.

It matters for rights, openness and alliances — but states still act on their interests whatever their system.

Democracy = power freely chosen and checked; authoritarianism = power concentrated and unchecked.

The framework through which power is organised and exercised — above all, the structure of the international system.

The absence of any world government above states, so each looks out for itself — not chaos.

How power is spread among the great powers: unipolar (one), bipolar (two) or multipolar (several).

One with a single dominant power.

One with two rival powers, as in the Cold War.

One with several great powers sharing influence.

When states form alliances so that no single power can dominate the rest.

From a brief post-Cold-War unipolar US moment toward a more multipolar world, with the rise of China and others.

With no world government (anarchy), states fend for themselves, and polarity sets how great powers balance each other.

It shapes rivalry and security strongly, but institutions, cooperation and ideas also shape what states do.

Realism — anarchy and polarity drive competition; liberals stress institutions, constructivists stress ideas.

The way relationships between actors change and interact over time — moving along the cooperation–competition–conflict spectrum.

When actors work together toward a shared goal, e.g. through trade deals, alliances or treaties.

When actors are rivals chasing the same goals but are not fighting — a peaceful rivalry.

Open hostility between actors, which can rise to war.

They can slide from cooperation into competition, or from conflict back toward peace, as interests and leaders change.

A rivalry between great powers over power and influence, short of war — e.g. US–China today.

It moved from decades of trade cooperation toward strategic competition — a relationship in motion.

Because actors rely on each other, interdependence raises the cost of war and can encourage cooperation.

The idea that one actor's gain is another's loss — a hallmark of the 'conflict is the norm' view.

Realists expect competition and conflict under anarchy; liberals expect cooperation to grow through trade and institutions.

Tracking the direction of travel — which way a relationship is moving — not just describing a snapshot.

The body of rules — international law — that governs relations between states.

The rules that govern how states behave toward each other, built from treaties, custom and the UN Charter.

Treaties (agreements states sign), customary law (long-standing practice) and the UN Charter.

A formal, binding agreement that states sign, such as the Paris Agreement.

Rules that come from long-standing, widely accepted state practice.

There is no world police to make states obey — they comply mostly by choice, for reputation and interest.

The International Criminal Court, which tries individuals for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

It can try leaders for the worst crimes, but has no police of its own and several powerful states are not members.

The International Court of Justice, which settles legal disputes between states.

For their reputation, their interests, and to keep the whole system of rules working.

It is real and shapes behaviour on routine matters, but is weak against powerful states that choose to defy it.

A shared standard of what counts as acceptable behaviour — an unwritten rule most actors follow because it is expected.

A law is written and (in theory) enforced; a norm is an unwritten shared expectation, enforced by reputation and shame.

As more actors adopt it, it spreads until it is simply taken for granted — 'just how things are done'.

The shared expectation that states should not interfere in each other's internal affairs.

A norm so strong that breaking it is seen as deeply unacceptable — e.g. using chemical weapons.

The norm that diplomats are protected and not arrested in the country they are posted to.

Using them triggers global outrage and pressure, showing a norm's power — but some states have broken it, showing its fragility.

Through reputation and shame — breaking one openly makes an act seem illegitimate.

Both: they shape behaviour and define legitimacy, but the powerful can break them and norms can erode.

Constructivism — shared beliefs and norms shape what states think is appropriate.

It weakens as enough actors break it, until it no longer shapes what is seen as acceptable.

An established, rule-based body through which politics operates — one that outlasts individual leaders.

An IGO is one kind of institution; 'institution' is broader — any established set of rules and bodies, from a constitution to a trade system.

Rules, continuity, a place to cooperate, and limits on power (checks and balances).

A parliament, the courts, a central bank and the civil service.

The UN, the EU and the WTO.

The institution that runs a country's money and interest rates.

It binds members with shared rules, a market and a court, locking in cooperation but also limiting their sovereignty.

They lock in cooperation, reduce uncertainty, provide continuity and constrain even powerful actors.

They mainly reflect the power of strong states and are only as strong as the powers behind them.

They outlast the leaders who pass through them, so politics keeps running as leaders change.

The view that institutions shape behaviour and help states cooperate, not just reflect power.