A campaign used to say one thing to everybody. Now it says different things to different groups, and each version is seen by almost nobody else — which removes the property that made a promise checkable.
Broadcast against targeting: who can compare what was said to whom.
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| What | Broadcast | Targeted |
|---|---|---|
| Who sees a message | Everybody, including opponents | One group |
| Who can check it | Journalists, opponents, anybody | Almost nobody |
| Can promises be compared? | Yes — side by side | No |
| How groups are defined | By region or programme | By inferred behaviour |
Inefficiency was doing a job: Broadcasting to people who disagreed with you was wasteful, and it was also what let them hold you to what you said. Targeting removed the waste and the accountability together.
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Digital systems also let people take part rather than only be reached, and that half is genuinely positive — though it is much smaller in scale.
Real-world examples you can name
Decidim, Barcelona's participation platform — launched 2016, open source
A platform where residents propose, debate and vote on city policy, with proposals traceable from submission to decision. Its code is open, so other cities run their own instances.
Who it affected: Residents who would not attend an evening meeting but will use a phone.
Facebook and Cambridge Analytica — disclosed March 2018; US FTC penalty July 2019
A personality-quiz app collected data not only from the people who installed it but from their friends, reaching tens of millions of profiles, which were then used to target political advertising. Facebook was fined US$5 billion by the FTC over its privacy practices.
Who it affected: Facebook users who never installed the app, and voters targeted by the campaigns.
Estonia's internet voting — national use since 2005; over half of votes cast online by 2023
Voters authenticate with a national ID card or mobile ID and may re-vote online during the advance period, with the last vote counting and a paper ballot overriding it. Critics argue verifiability and coercion remain unsolved.
Who it affected: Estonian voters, and every state weighing convenience against verifiability.
Why the remedy is an archive: Requiring every political advert to be published in a searchable library restores the one thing broadcasting had: anybody can see what was said to whom.
How this is tested — elections and campaigning are a frequent Paper 2 topic and reward an answer about visibility rather than about persuasion. It comes up two ways:
Paper 1 — structured question
- Part c: evaluate targeted political advertising
- Part b: explain why targeting is hard to scrutinise
Paper 2 — source-based question
- Q4: synthesise sources on elections and platforms
- HL Paper 3: recommend a rule about campaign advertising
The trap: “it manipulates people”: Evidence that targeting changes many votes is weak. The strong argument is about who can check what was promised.
Explain one reason why targeted political advertising is difficult to scrutinise.
Model answer plan
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To what extent do digital technologies strengthen democratic participation?
Model answer plan
See the mark-by-mark plan — for / against / judgement, with marking guidance — in study mode.